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TOP SECRET

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Berlin
July 12, 1961 *R*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Berlin Crisis and the Desirability
of



- 1 -

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-01-081-7-3-3
By MAD NARA, Date 10/04

I might add that I also cannot understand all of the publicity that is being given to a possible call-up of reserve and National Guard forces. Surely this publicity (or the call-up) is not going to deter Khrushchev. Quiet strengthening of our forces on the ground in Europe I can understand as a deterrent. I also understand that this may have to be accompanied by some replacement of the forces deployed to Europe from the reserves and National Guard. But the separate emphasis upon the call-up of reserve and National Guard forces is likely to be viewed as a publicity stunt -- an ineffectual effort to deter by scare tactics.

I also hope that we are clear in our own minds that any action undertaken in the civil defense field in the next few months is unlikely to have a very significant effect in reducing casualties in the event of attack on the U. S. during the Berlin crisis. We may want to use the Berlin crisis as a stimulus to action on a real shelter program, but the President ought to have a very hardheaded analysis of how much effect proposed actions will have.

Finally, I hope that we are giving due consideration to the long-lasting negative as well as positive effects of the psychology we are now creating. In my view, one of the greatest costs of the Korean War consisted of the attitudes it induced in the government and outside. It resulted in an emphasis upon the wrong threat and introduced a rigidity into our policy that we have been a long time undoing. I realize, of course, that the effects of a Berlin crisis which does not result in war will have a more limited impact in this respect than did actual involvement in the Korean War.



Robert H. Johnson

cc: Mr. Owen
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Komer